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Phenomenological Research

Introduction

❶Putnam — Contains many key essays in existential phenomenology. Some analytic questions arose:

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Then I explain how I did my study and briefly mention the themes and the results. The understanding of the main theme, mentalization, was also rooted in phenomenological thinking, just as the theoretical analysis of another theme, time, was founded in phenomenological ideas. Finally, I touch upon the direction in which phenomenological methods are moving, giving an additional example from my own study.

They do, however, have a common point of departure and agree on the fundamental phenomenological task: Likewise, a clearly delimited definition of the term phenomenology is difficult. Spiegelberg adopts a broad definition, which includes the use of a direct intuition as the source and final test of all knowledge to be incorporated as faithfully as possible in descriptions Spiegelberg. The phenomenological philosophy emerged at the end of the nineteenth century.

It was anticipated by the work Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint by Franz Brentano and was developed by Edmund Husserl, who is normally considered the founder of phenomenology.

Phenomenological philosophy was initially referred to as phenomenological psychology Brentano However, the connection between the philosophical theory and psychology has been a matter of great debate. Brentano considered psychology to be the proper lever for the necessary reform of philosophy and for the restoration of scientific metaphysics. However, he realized that none of the previous psychologies could fill his specifications as they lacked the indispensible primary clarification of their fundamental concepts.

Brentano hoped to develop a scientific psychology that constituted the philosophical prolegoma to an empirical psychology Spiegelberg However, Brentano's view can be regarded as psychologism see below.

Nevertheless, many of the thoughts in his book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint from Brentano are considered to be the founding of phenomenology. In addition, modern psychological theory Fonagy et al. Freud like Husserl was one of Brentano's students and was also inspired by his ideas Fancher Phenomenology has developed to become one of the main currents in modern philosophy, especially in Europe, but also in the United States.

Phenomenology represents a rupture with an epistemological dualism and is concerned with the study of consciousness. Phenomenology tries to unite philosophy, science and lifeworld and attaches importance to rich contextualized descriptions, based on experience. In this way, it becomes an essentially reflexive enterprise Toombs In addition, it demands a scientific approach to subjectivity Natanson , as also stressed by Schutz The different methods study this through rich descriptions or narratives that can illuminate the lived world.

The aim is to see things in their appearance. Husserl's project was primarily epistemological Husserl He did not believe that it was possible to separate the experiencing subject from what is experienced in the world. The world can only appear for a subject and the condition for its appearance lies outside the world itself, namely in the subject Zahavi Husserl's intention was to study consciousness and how phenomena in the world are constituted by the human consciousness.

He wanted to describe how phenomena appear to the subject and how experience is established. Husserl thought that it was not possible to isolate the objects from the subject experiencing them. His aim was to describe and develop a universal phenomenology conceived as the ultimate foundation and critique of all knowledge, claiming that phenomenology could put philosophy and science on the right course Spiegelberg Psychologists have adopted Husserl's method in their approach to understanding specific aspects of our human experience of the world.

According to Giorgi, Husserl discusses not what would comprise a phenomenologically based psychology but rather what is required for a phenomenological clarification of the conceptual foundations of psychology, and Husserl's work can therefore be considered a distinctively phenomenological contribution to philosophy of mind.

Some of the concepts Husserl developed are used in phenomenological qualitative methods. In contrast to Brentano, Husserl does not distinguish between the intentional and the real object. Human consciousness is intentional in the sense that it is not empty; it is always directed against something Zahavi. One cannot think or feel without thinking or feeling something. Whenever a person is conscious or aware, he or she is conscious or aware of something in the world outside the subject.

Therefore the focus is on the way consciousness is turned out on the world and on the relationship between a person's consciousness and the world, including the relationships between people. Intentionality is that component of any act that is responsible not only for pointing at an object but also for interpreting pre-given materials in such a way that a full object is presented to our consciousness Spiegelberg.

Husserl insisted that it is philosophically unacceptable to take the validity of the natural attitude for granted. We should not let preconceived theories form our experience but rather let our experience determine our theories.

Husserl describes how we should let our intuition be the source of all knowledge. We must suspend our acceptance of the natural attitude and bracket its validity. In phenomenological reduction efforts should be made to treat all details with equal value. This is achieved through horizontalization, trying to understand all phenomena at the same level by not prioritizing phenomena Langdridge Insight can also be gained through eidetic variation , which means attempting to imagine the object being different from how it currently is Zahavi This can be done by imaginatively varying features of the phenomenon, for example, when analyzing data about medical issues imagining doctors are nurses and vice versa.

Husserl thought that through different stages of reduction it was possible to reach a more fundamental understanding of the phenomena Spiegelberg Husserl thought that this transcendental reduction was possible, while some of his successors thought this could be only partially achieved.

The aim is the same in qualitative research: Some phenomenologists maintain that it is possible through thorough detailed description to reach an understanding of the essences of things or phenomena Giorgi without the need for interpretation. This has been rejected by others. In relation to qualitative methods, this discrepancy is mirrored in the disagreement about whether interpretation has a place in the analysis or whether the analysis must depend solely on description.

However, most of Husserl's followers developed phenomenology in less essentialist directions and stated that interpretation could not be avoided and that descriptions also involved interpretation Gadamer ; Heidegger ; Langdridge ; Ricoeur Heidegger introduced the existential turn in phenomenology. His aim was to understand existence. According to Heidegger, being always presupposes the being of something. The investigation of Being must choose a thematized being for analysis.

This includes analyzing one's own Being in a circular process where the formulation of the investigative method also articulates the kind of Being to be investigated Stolorow Dasein is not another nomenclature for the human being man or subject but rather an expression for a definite structure which makes our understanding of Being possible Figal and includes a dimension of disclosure Large Entity is more dehumanized Stolorow Dasein's own Being is an issue for it.

Dasein understands itself in its Being Heidegger Heidegger considers his method of investigating our own understanding to be a phenomenological one aimed at illuminating the fundamental structures of our own understanding of our Being.

It must be unconcealed by means of interpretation of that understanding:. Phenomenological interpretation must make it possible for Dasein itself to disclose things primordially; it must, as it were, let Dasein interpret itself. Heidegger , p. Phenomenology relies on description. However, Heidegger thinks that all description inevitably involves interpretation and he develops phenomenology in a hermeneutic direction.

Heidegger , pp. For Heidegger, interpretation is a further development of understanding: Through his concern with the ontological foundation of experiencing and understanding Heidegger displaces the concept of understanding. Understanding is a way of being situated in time and space. We are always already thrown into a preexisting world of people and objects, language, and culture and this constitutes our existence. The conditions for all human Being are an understanding which is not rationalistic but is rooted in our very existence.

This existing is always factical Heidegger Our understanding is always rooted in a world of doings and practice Dreyfus Time and temporality was a major issue of concern for Heidegger Heidegger Our experience and our existence are always understood in a temporal context between past, present, and future. Dasein is a process in a threefold temporal context and directedness: Each element of care has its basis in temporality and the meaning of care is temporality.

Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care. Dasein's existentiality is always more than it is at a given time-point. We understand things from certain framework conditions, which we cannot objectify or explain completely. We see things in their appearing , which means that a phenomenon is not clearly showing itself but that it makes itself known, announcing itself without showing itself. Finding a meaning therefore always involves an element of interpretation Smith et al.

The word phenomenology is derived from the Greek phenomenon and logos. Phenomenon means appearance, which can have different forms where some are disguised or latent. Logos, or discourse, is the analytical thinking, which helps facilitate or grasp this appearing. As in qualitative analysis, coming to a possible understanding of an underlying meaning of another person's description of phenomena depends on this analytical thinking, reflection, and interpretation.

For Heidegger, phenomenology meant to make sense of the appearing and he argued against a presuppositionless descriptive phenomenology Heidegger Our understanding is always founded upon the fore-conception.

Interpretation becomes a cyclical activity from the things to the forestructure. The fore-structure is always there but Heidegger thought that the understanding of one's own fore-structures went through the experience of the things themselves.

We are not aware of the forestructures beforehand, and we cannot uncover the forestructures in other ways than through analysis of the things or phenomena. For example, when encountering a text we do not know which of our forestructures are relevant. This is revealed through engagement with the text and reflection upon what could possibly have influenced the interpretation. Further, Heidegger opened up phenomenology to interpretation through language. Through language he anticipated the narrative approach, which was later formulated by Ricoeur, who saw narrative and time as mutually related.

In his considerations about time, Ricoeur takes a point of departure in Heidegger's thinking Ricoeur Heidegger's dynamic understanding of foreunderstanding and the greater focus on interpretation led to a reevaluation of the role of bracketing Smith et al.

This form of bracketing calls for a process of thorough reflexivity where the researchers discuss the preconceptions and forestructures that the analysis has made them aware of and that they make these preconceptions transparent to the audience or the readers. A repeated circle of bracketing processes is inevitable.

We suspend attention to selected phenomena, for the time being, to concentrate on other phenomena. Gadamer accepted Heidegger's claim that phenomenology must proceed in hermeneutic fashion.

Gadamer addresses the fundamental problems of phenomenology. He does so, however, not in Husserlian terminology but in elaborating on the ontology of language and the accessibility of the truth and presence of things Figal Heidegger stressed the need for interpretation.

Gadamer realized it fully, both epistemologically and methodologically. In Gadamer's view understanding is always interpretation Gadamer Like Heidegger, Gadamer emphasized that our very existence is hermeneutic. In his principal work Truth and Method Gadamer , he points to the essential prejudice character of all understanding.

Because we are influenced by prejudices our openness to the world is biased and we can never, even through reflection, entirely keep a critical distance and objectify. For Gadamer, the past has a truly pervasive power in the phenomenon of understanding Linge Like prejudice and tradition, the past also defines the ground the interpreter himself occupies when he understands.

We always have a horizon of meanings because the world has always already been given a meaning for us. The interpretations we make of ourselves and our surroundings are determined by conditions which we can never explain comprehensively.

Understanding involves the person who tries to understand and who interprets. With Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics the horizon of the interpreter enters into the picture. This is also the case for historical events.

Understanding is from the present perspective. The past is contained in the present and is interpreted from that perspective. All interpretation implies a form of perspectivism and is necessarily selective. Our historical context gives direction and sets limits for what can be experienced. We are born into a community based on traditions.

In this way history does not belong to us, we belong to history Gadamer According to Gadamer we must, in contrast to traditional hermeneutics, abstain from the subjectivity of the subject. Like Heidegger, he underlines the inevitable influence of the interpreter's horizon and the existential dimension of this understanding: Understanding is the original form of the realization of Dasein Gadamer This understanding is both conditioned and limited by an always already linguistically and historically promoted understanding which we take for granted.

Gadamer drew attention to the importance of language Gadamer Interpretation had to find an appropriate language to present the understanding.

All understanding is linguistic in the sense that language constitutes the conceptual basis for understanding. Gadamer thinks that we can never free ourselves from our prejudices and our ways of understanding based on the time we are living in, not even as researchers.

It is not possible to reach a complete and correct interpretation. Understanding is based on the application of the phenomenon to our own context Gadamer Gadamer attaches little importance to precise methodological questions but rather is occupied with the understanding which precedes every systematic and specific investigation.

His hermeneutics represents a criticism of all forms of method fixation in human sciences and sciences of art and should be related to practical life Gadamer Gadamer , p. This gives the philosophical hermeneutics a form of universality. All sciences have common features and are basically historical and interpretive.

As a philosopher, Ricoeur also took his point of departure in phenomenology. His primary philosophical inspiration came from Husserl and Jaspers.

Later, however, he combined phenomenological description with hermeneutic interpretation Ricoeur Ricoeur was particularly concerned with interpretation, primarily with interpreting text. He stated that human action should be understood as text and that such an approach would enable better understanding and interpretation. Ricoeur was critical of Husserlian phenomenology.

To Ricoeur, phenomenology did not carry the significance of universal method that it did for Husserl. Instead he developed a dialectic of methods and a reflective philosophy. He thought it impossible that man could know himself directly or introspectively.

This led to an indirect reflective procedure and a route via symbol and interpretation, which constituted the opening of a hermeneutic phenomenology Ihde Ricoeur formulated two forms of hermeneutics or interpretation: Ricoeur states that an area where all philosophical investigations cut across one another is the area of language This led him from a perceptualist to a linguistic phenomenology Ihde He distinguished between discourse and language.

Discourse is the spoken language, sentences which give meaning, exist temporarily and are addressed to another. Language is a system of signs and exists outside time.

Discourse can be spoken or written; transcripts of research interviews are something in between. In written discourse the possibility of capturing the intention of the author fades, such that any appropriation of meaning must always remain an approximation.

Appropriation is the way in which we attempt to interpret meaning Ricoeur Ricoeur's thinking was that the text is both taken at face-value and described from a phenomenological standpoint and interpreted with a hermeneutic interpretation.

This demands a search for hidden meanings through the interpretation of symbols and myths Ricoeur A key element for Ricoeur of engaging with the text was the notion of play Ricoeur , p. Play is used as indirect approaches to works of art or dreams and is not always conscious. Furthermore, one always speaks from somewhere, which means that the subject, including oneself, must be subjected to a hermeneutic critique.

We always occupy an ideological position even if we are unaware of it. In his later writings, Ricoeur concentrated on thoughts about narrative Ricoeur , Ricoeur's thinking is that the creation of meaning intrinsic to humanity can be understood only through the analysis of metaphor and narrative. In this way it is possible to gain access to the creative process in action. Stories are constructed to make sense of our lived experience through the organization of disparate elements into meaningful wholes.

Narratives call the subject into being and serve to situate its experience in time. According to Ricoeur, every narrative is concerned with experience in time and the narrative competence makes time a human time when it is experienced or told as a narrative Kemp ; Ricoeur Ricoeur's narrative theory is a continuation of Heidegger's unfinished project of understanding human existence as essentially temporal Ricoeur ; Vanhoozer Narrative identities are constructed through the stories we construct.

Ricoeur's narrative theory has inspired narrative analytic approaches in qualitative research Hoshmand ; Mattingly and the development of a phenomenologically inspired narrative analytic method Langdridge The aim of the study was to explore how general practitioners GPs understand patients with emotional problems or mental disorders, to study their process of understanding.

I used observation of consultations with some of the GPs in their standard surgeries to see how the different approaches were reflected in the normal workday and how external circumstances influenced involvement with emotional problems.

My interest was to consider how psychological interventions could be described, conceptualized, and integrated into a theoretical framework of general practice, psychological, and psychotherapeutic thinking. The intention was to study processes of understanding and relationship formation and to identify ingredients and patterns of conduct Davidsen b. The analysis was originally planned as a phenomenological analysis as described by Giorgi and modified by Malterud There was a tradition for this meaning-condensing method at our research unit.

However, during the analytic process it transpired that the data consisted of inconsistent narratives and complex processes of formation of understandings existing in parallel. I felt that it was not possible to reach a deeper understanding of these phenomena with a method that focused exclusively on descriptions. A deeper understanding demanded more complexity-sensitive ways of thinking and a method that allowed interpretation, exploration of dynamics and processes, and involvement of the context.

I applied the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, which is a well-described method combining hermeneutic and phenomenological thought with interactionist ideas Smith This method was used in the subsequent analytic stage of the interviews. In a final analytic step I undertook a narrative analysis of the material. The steps in the analysis are described in detail below. I did, however, realize that the description-interpretation debate is more complicated than this Langdridge and will discuss this later.

The analytic process started as early as during the first interview. The interviews were formed as a dialogue between the participants and me. The meaning of what was said was interpreted, verified, and communicated during the interview. This meaning was pursued and clarified, and sometimes the GPs interpreted their own told stories. The interview material was constructed in an interpersonal relational interaction and the development of the dialogue demanded in itself an analysis of what was said to allow the dialogue to proceed.

The transcription process was also a form of analysis. During the transcription I took notes of what came into my mind as interesting, surprising, puzzling or common. The structural analysis of the transcribed interviews began after the first four interviews as the stepwise recruiting was supported by this analysis.

As mentioned, the material of this study was analyzed in different rounds using different forms of structural analysis, later being subjected to a narrative analysis. Each of these rounds supplemented the preceding one and developed the analytic work. This meaning-condensing method covers four steps: During this analysis the material was coded according to the developing themes.

Three main themes emerged: These themes were divided into subthemes describing different dimensions of the process of understanding, different approaches to handling psychological interventions and different dimensions of time as necessary preconditions for these interventions to be successful.

The subthemes formed descriptive codes. The first structural analysis revealed that the participants differed greatly in their process of understanding patients. Some had an understanding approach, which pervaded all consultations, also those about somatic matters. These participants offered more talking therapies and had a more reflective stance than other participants and there was greater disclosure of emotional problems in normal consultations with this participant than with the others.

An intermediate group showed a more limited understanding and asked mainly about workplace and family problems if patients revealed emotional problems. They did not try to disclose less obvious factors or past events in the patient's life.

Other participants could be dismissive and unreflective regarding the patient's perspective. They might feel patients were irritating and the lack of mutual understanding likewise pervaded all consultations, making them seemingly unhelpful at times.

Some participants had an exclusively biomedical approach and deliberately chose not to involve themselves in psychological work. They defined emotional matters as not belonging to their working area. None of the participants described any specific method, structure or therapeutic technique used in talking therapy.

They used no theoretical language or professional terms for what they did and they had difficulties in explaining in general terms how they carried out talking therapy. From their detailed descriptions of therapeutic sessions, the ingredients could be identified. They all mentioned the importance of giving time, being open to what the patient had on his or her mind and showing this openness to make the patient feel safe and trusting Davidsen a. According to Giorgi, the phenomenological approach allows only descriptions and not interpretations:.

The true significance of the descriptive task within phenomenology comes through when one considers the alternatives to description, viz. Giorgi , p. Langdridge has argued that interpretation is necessarily present in qualitative research However, he acknowledges the need for a thorough description to reach greater understanding, still realizing the importance of the interpretive approaches and maintaining that interpretation is not in opposition to the phenomenological idea.

According to Langdridge we must, however, distinguish between the different understandings of description and interpretation. Interpretation must be distinguished from explanation and causes and instead focus on a description of reasons.

Furthermore, there is no hard-and-fast boundary between description and interpretation. Instead they represent different dimensions Langdridge Heidegger uses different terms for understanding Verstehen and interpretation Auslegung. For Heidegger as well as for Gadamer the problem seems to be how true interpretive understandings can be distinguished from misunderstandings Carr In the hermeneutic position the very thing that renders the object accessible to us is interpretation.

However, it is also kept from being totally accessible. In opposition to the Husserlian notion of self-evidence another interpretation is always possible Carr. Ricoeur takes up a third position with the turn to meaning and a request for reflexivity. This means that interpretation can be thought of as opening new possibilities Langdridge These are, however, always seen from the position of the researcher and influenced by prejudices and ideologies Gadamer ; Heidegger ; Ricoeur I thought that I could not have avoided using interpretation right from the beginning of the data collection and during the analytic process.

Guiding the interview and choosing the relevant themes from the transcriptions could not be done without some element of interpretation. Furthermore, I realized that the context, the interactions between patient and GP had to be incorporated. This required a method that could grasp these interacting processes. Some analytic questions arose: Concomitantly I realized a need for a more idiographic approach with greater emphasis on each individual case Smith et al.

The next step was a second structural analysis where I used the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis IPA , which was first described by Smith at a developmental stage where the theoretical roots are dealt with. The method was later described in further detail in a more schematized way Smith et al. However, as with the other qualitative methods IPA offers no recipe, the researcher must adapt the method to his or her own particular way and topic.

It involves a dynamic process with an active role of the researcher. It acknowledges the influence of the researcher's own conceptions and the interpretative activity involved. It also borrows from symbolic interactionism and its perception that the meanings individuals ascribe to events are of central concern, that those meanings are obtained through interpretation and that they are a result of social interactions Smith For IPA, analysis always involves interpretation.

Heidegger's notion of appearing captures IPA's apprehension of interpretation as a form of detective work in which the phenomena are called forth and the researcher tries to make sense of what appears during the analysis. This is a reflective practice with a dynamic process of reflecting upon one's own preconceptions. The researcher is not necessarily aware of these preconceptions and they may only be realized in a cyclical process with the text or other data material.

The researcher enters into a hermeneutic circle with a dynamic and cyclical approach to bracketing Smith et al. The Encyclopedia of Phenomenology Kluwer Academic Publishers, features separate articles on the following seven types of phenomenology: The contrast between "constitutive phenomenology" German: Modern scholarship also recognizes the existence of the following varieties: Austin 's linguistic phenomenology [25] see ordinary language philosophy , and post-analytic phenomenology [26] see postanalytic philosophy.

Intentionality refers to the notion that consciousness is always the consciousness of something. The word itself should not be confused with the "ordinary" use of the word intentional, but should rather be taken as playing on the etymological roots of the word.

Originally, intention referred to a "stretching out" "in tension," from Latin intendere , and in this context it refers to consciousness "stretching out" towards its object. However, one should be careful with this image: Intentionality is often summed up as "aboutness. This means that the object of consciousness doesn't have to be a physical object apprehended in perception: Consequently, these "structures" of consciousness, i. The term "intentionality" originated with the Scholastics in the medieval period and was resurrected by Brentano who in turn influenced Husserl's conception of phenomenology, who refined the term and made it the cornerstone of his theory of consciousness.

The meaning of the term is complex and depends entirely on how it is conceived by a given philosopher. The term should not be confused with "intention" or the psychoanalytic conception of unconscious "motive" or "gain". Intuition in phenomenology refers to cases where the intentional object is directly present to the intentionality at play; if the intention is "filled" by the direct apprehension of the object, you have an intuited object. Having a cup of coffee in front of you, for instance, seeing it, feeling it, or even imagining it — these are all filled intentions, and the object is then intuited.

The same goes for the apprehension of mathematical formulae or a number. If you do not have the object as referred to directly, the object is not intuited, but still intended, but then emptily. Examples of empty intentions can be signitive intentions — intentions that only imply or refer to their objects. In everyday language, we use the word evidence to signify a special sort of relation between a state of affairs and a proposition: State A is evidence for the proposition "A is true.

In Husserl's phenomenology, which is quite common, this pair of terms, derived from the Greek nous mind , designate respectively the real content, noesis, and the ideal content, noema, of an intentional act an act of consciousness.

The Noesis is the part of the act that gives it a particular sense or character as in judging or perceiving something, loving or hating it, accepting or rejecting it, and so on. This is real in the sense that it is actually part of what takes place in the consciousness or psyche of the subject of the act. The Noesis is always correlated with a Noema ; for Husserl, the full Noema is a complex ideal structure comprising at least a noematic sense and a noematic core. The correct interpretation of what Husserl meant by the Noema has long been controversial, but the noematic sense is generally understood as the ideal meaning of the act [29] and the noematic core as the act's referent or object as it is meant in the act.

One element of controversy is whether this noematic object is the same as the actual object of the act assuming it exists or is some kind of ideal object. In phenomenology, empathy refers to the experience of one's own body as another. While we often identify others with their physical bodies, this type of phenomenology requires that we focus on the subjectivity of the other, as well as our intersubjective engagement with them.

In Husserl's original account, this was done by a sort of apperception built on the experiences of your own lived-body. The lived body is your own body as experienced by yourself, as yourself. Your own body manifests itself to you mainly as your possibilities of acting in the world. It is what lets you reach out and grab something, for instance, but it also, and more importantly, allows for the possibility of changing your point of view. This helps you differentiate one thing from another by the experience of moving around it, seeing new aspects of it often referred to as making the absent present and the present absent , and still retaining the notion that this is the same thing that you saw other aspects of just a moment ago it is identical.

Your body is also experienced as a duality, both as object you can touch your own hand and as your own subjectivity you experience being touched. The experience of your own body as your own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another's body, which, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. You can thus recognise the Other's intentions, emotions, etc.

This experience of empathy is important in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. In phenomenology, intersubjectivity constitutes objectivity i. This does not imply that objectivity is reduced to subjectivity nor does it imply a relativist position, cf. In the experience of intersubjectivity, one also experiences oneself as being a subject among other subjects, and one experiences oneself as existing objectively for these Others ; one experiences oneself as the noema of Others' noeses, or as a subject in another's empathic experience.

As such, one experiences oneself as objectively existing subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of one's lifeworld, especially as "homeworld. Lebenswelt is the "world" each one of us lives in. One could call it the "background" or "horizon" of all experience, and it is that on which each object stands out as itself as different and with the meaning it can only hold for us.

The lifeworld is both personal and intersubjective it is then called a "homeworld" , and, as such, it does not enclose each one of us in a solus ipse. In the first edition of the Logical Investigations , still under the influence of Brentano, Husserl describes his position as "descriptive psychology. The first volume of the Logical Investigations , the Prolegomena to Pure Logic , begins with a devastating critique of psychologism , i. Husserl establishes a separate field for research in logic, philosophy, and phenomenology, independently from the empirical sciences.

Some years after the publication of the Logical Investigations , Husserl made some key elaborations that led him to the distinction between the act of consciousness noesis and the phenomena at which it is directed the noemata. What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and inasmuch it is given in the intentional acts.

Knowledge of essences would only be possible by "bracketing" all assumptions about the existence of an external world and the inessential subjective aspects of how the object is concretely given to us. Husserl in a later period concentrated more on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness.

As he wanted to exclude any hypothesis on the existence of external objects, he introduced the method of phenomenological reduction to eliminate them. What was left over was the pure transcendental ego, as opposed to the concrete empirical ego.

Now Transcendental Phenomenology is the study of the essential structures that are left in pure consciousness: This amounts in practice to the study of the noemata and the relations among them. The philosopher Theodor Adorno criticised Husserl's concept of phenomenological epistemology in his metacritique Against Epistemology , which is anti-foundationalist in its stance.

After Husserl's publication of the Ideen in , many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories. Especially the members of the Munich group distanced themselves from his new transcendental phenomenology and preferred the earlier realist phenomenology of the first edition of the Logical Investigations. Existential phenomenology differs from transcendental phenomenology by its rejection of the transcendental ego.

Merleau-Ponty objects to the ego's transcendence of the world, which for Husserl leaves the world spread out and completely transparent before the conscious. Heidegger thinks of a conscious being as always already in the world. Transcendence is maintained in existential phenomenology to the extent that the method of phenomenology must take a presuppositionless starting point — transcending claims about the world arising from, for example, natural or scientific attitudes or theories of the ontological nature of the world.

While Husserl thought of philosophy as a scientific discipline that had to be founded on a phenomenology understood as epistemology , Martin Heidegger held a radically different view. Heidegger himself states their differences this way:. According to Heidegger, philosophy was not at all a scientific discipline, but more fundamental than science itself.

According to him science is only one way of knowing the world with no special access to truth. Furthermore, the scientific mindset itself is built on a much more "primordial" foundation of practical, everyday knowledge. Husserl was skeptical of this approach, which he regarded as quasi-mystical, and it contributed to the divergence in their thinking. Instead of taking phenomenology as prima philosophia or a foundational discipline, Heidegger took it as a metaphysical ontology: Phenomena are not the foundation or Ground of Being.

Neither are they appearances, for, as Heidegger argues in Being and Time , an appearance is "that which shows itself in something else," while a phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself. While for Husserl we would have to abstract from all concrete determinations of our empirical ego, to be able to turn to the field of pure consciousness, Heidegger claims that "the possibilities and destinies of philosophy are bound up with man's existence, and thus with temporality and with historicality.

However, ontological being and existential being are different categories, so Heidegger's conflation of these categories is, according to Husserl's view, the root of Heidegger's error.

Husserl charged Heidegger with raising the question of ontology but failing to answer it, instead switching the topic to the Dasein, the only being for whom Being is an issue. That is neither ontology nor phenomenology, according to Husserl, but merely abstract anthropology. To clarify, perhaps, by abstract anthropology, as a non-existentialist searching for essences, Husserl rejected the existentialism implicit in Heidegger's distinction between beings qua existents as things in reality and their Being as it unfolds in Dasein's own reflections on its being-in-the-world, wherein being becomes present to us, that is, is unconcealed.

Some researchers in phenomenology in particular in reference to Heidegger's legacy see possibilities of establishing dialogues with traditions of thought outside of the so-called Western philosophy , particularly with respect to East-Asian thinking , and despite perceived differences between "Eastern" and "Western".

There are also recent signs of the reception of phenomenology and Heidegger's thought in particular within scholarly circles focused on studying the impetus of metaphysics in the history of ideas in Islam and Early Islamic philosophy such as in the works of the Lebanese philosopher Nader El-Bizri ; [37] perhaps this is tangentially due to the indirect influence of the tradition of the French Orientalist and phenomenologist Henri Corbin , and later accentuated through El-Bizri's dialogues with the Polish phenomenologist Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.

In addition, the work of Jim Ruddy in the field of comparative philosophy , combined the concept of Transcendental Ego in Husserl's phenomenology with the concept of the primacy of self-consciousness in the work of Sankaracharya. In the course of this work, Ruddy uncovered a wholly new eidetic phenomenological science, which he called "convergent phenomenology.

James Moor has argued that computers show up policy vacuums that require new thinking and the establishment of new policies. For the phenomenologist, society and technology co-constitute each other; they are each other's ongoing condition, or possibility for being what they are. For them technology is not just the artifact. Rather, the artifact already emerges from a prior 'technological' attitude towards the world Heidegger For Heidegger the essence of technology is the way of being of modern humans—a way of conducting themselves towards the world—that sees the world as something to be ordered and shaped in line with projects, intentions and desires—a 'will to power' that manifests itself as a 'will to technology'.

However, according to Heidegger this 'pre-technological' age or mood is one where humans' relation with the world and artifacts, their way of being disposed, was poetic and aesthetic rather than technological enframing. In critiquing the artificial intelligence AI programme, Hubert Dreyfus argues that the way skill development has become understood in the past has been wrong.

He argues, this is the model that the early artificial intelligence community uncritically adopted. In opposition to this view, he argues, with Heidegger, that what we observe when we learn a new skill in everyday practice is in fact the opposite.

We most often start with explicit rules or preformulated approaches and then move to a multiplicity of particular cases, as we become an expert. His argument draws directly on Heidegger's account in "Being and Time" of humans as beings that are always already situated in-the-world. As humans 'in-the-world', we are already experts at going about everyday life, at dealing with the subtleties of every particular situation; that is why everyday life seems so obvious. Thus, the intricate expertise of everyday activity is forgotten and taken for granted by AI as an assumed starting point.

It is the assumed, and forgotten, horizon of everyday practice that makes technological devices and solutions show up as meaningful. If we are to understand technology we need to 'return' to the horizon of meaning that made it show up as the artifacts we need, want and desire.

We need to consider how these technologies reveal or disclose us. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article is about phenomenology in philosophy. For phenomenology as a research method, see Phenomenography. For phenomenology as an approach in psychology, see Phenomenology psychology. This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.

February Learn how and when to remove this template message. Antipositivism Deconstruction Ecophenomenology Existentialism Geneva School Gestalt therapy Hermeneutics Heterophenomenology Ideasthesia Important publications in phenomenological psychology List of phenomenologists Phenomenography Phenomenological sociology Phenomenological Thomism Phenomenology architecture Phenomenology of religion Phenomenology psychology Philosophical anthropology Poststructuralism Psychodrama Qualia Social constructionism Structuralism Structuration theory Technoethics.

Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences, 7 2: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Consciousness and the Self. New Youk, Dordrecht, London: Retrieved 17 December The fateful separation of transcendental philosophy and psychology". Northwestern University Press, , pg.


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Phenomenology in business research focuses on experiences, events and occurrences with disregard or minimum regard for the external and physical reality. Phenomenology, also known as non-positivism, is a variation of interpretivism, along with other variations such .

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Qualitative Method of Research: Phenomenological Mark George Bound, Ph. D. Nova Southeastern University October 10, Qualitative Inquiry: Phenomenological Research This course identifies five different methods of qualitative research inquiry, narrative, phenomenological, participatory action.

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Phenomenological Research Methods Clark Moustakas, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks California, I Human Science Perspectives and Models. Hermeneutic phenomenology is in line with this empirical direction. Hermeneutical phenomenology, as described by Van Manen (), is a means to combine hermeneutics with phenomenology, and is thus both interpretive and.

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MethodSpace is a multidimensional online network for the community of researchers, from students to professors, engaged in research methods. Sponsored by SAGE Publishing, a leading publisher of books and journals in research methods, the site is created for students and researchers to network and share research, resources and debates. Phenomenology Methods & Data Collection This module provides an overview of research methods for phenomenological studies and describes means of data collection. Learning Objectives: List and describe the steps involved in a phenomenology study.